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Abstract
Auctions are playing an increasingly prominent role in the planning and operation of
energy markets. Comparing the New Electricity Trading Arrangements to the former
electricity Pool in England and Wales requires some analysis of the relative merits of
uniform versus discriminatory pricing rules, and use of the gas network in Britain and
electricity interconnectors around Europe is allocated on the basis of auction results.
In this paper we discuss the changes in the trading arrangements in the electricity
industry in England and Wales as well as some of the results to date. We also look at
the wider issue of using auctions to replace regulation by market solutions for
managing the natural monopolies in energy markets.
JEL:  D44, L5, L94, L95
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Auctions and energy markets
Auction design is at the heart of the evolving energy markets in Britain. In electricity, the
New Electricity Trading Arrangements (NETA) replaced the former Electricity Pool on 27
March 2001. This represents the most important change in the design of the wholesale
electricity market since privatisation in 1990. NETA also reflects a major change in the
philosophy of market design, a subject that remains controversial. The Pool that NETA
replaced operated as a single (or uniform) price daily auction that allowed the System
Operator (SO) to match all demand and supply and determine the market-clearing price. In
contrast, under NETA, the SO confines his actions to operating a residual balancing market,
which is run as a pay-as-bid or discriminatory auction, and which produces two imbalance
prices.
In gas, auctions have been introduced for allocating gas transmission capacity and gas
storage, and have been proposed for guiding capacity investment decisions. Proposals were
made for auctioning access to British electricity transmission capacity, but these have not
been implemented. The French-English electricity interconnector is, however, auctioned, as
are a number of electricity interconnectors on the Continent, including Netherlands-Germany,
Netherlands-Belgium and Denmark-Germany.
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2This paper will briefly describe the reasons for changing the trading arrangements in
the electricity industry, the nature of those changes, and the results to date. We also look at
the wider issue of using auctions to replace regulation by market solutions for managing the
natural monopolies in energy markets.
The reform of electricity trading arrangements
The reform of electricity trading arrangements was prompted by growing dissatisfaction with
market manipulation in the Electricity Pool. In October 1997 the Minister for Science,
Energy and Technology asked the Director General of Electricity Supply to consider how a
review of electricity trading arrangements might be undertaken and to report results by July
1998. The timetable of that consultation is set out in Ofgem (2002), the deadline was met, the
proposed reforms approved and set in motion with the planned date of “Go-live” set at 21
November, 2000. The Utilities Act 2000 introduced the necessary license changes on 8
August 2000, and on 14 August the Balancing and Settlement Code (BSC) came into effect.
There were perhaps inevitable delays in ensuring that the IT systems were robust and reliable,
and on 27 October the electricity and gas regulator, Ofgem, announced that “Go-live” date
would be delayed until 27 March 2001.
The objectives of Ofgem’s predecessor (the electricity regulator, Offer),  which were
approved by the Government, were to consider whether, and if so what, changes in the
electricity arrangements would: best meet the needs of customers with respect to price, choice,
quality and security of supply; enable demand to be met efficiently and economically; enable
costs and risks to be reduced and shared efficiently, provide transparency; respond flexibly to
changing circumstances; promote competition in electricity markets, facilitating entry and exit
from such markets; avoid discrimination against particular energy sources; and be compatible
with Government policies (Offer, 1998d,  pp83-4).
The Pool also set up a Pool Review Steering Group to propose a set of objectives for
these trading arrangements. They agreed the overall objective was ‘that trading arrangements
should deliver the lowest possible sustainable prices to all customers, for a supply that is reliable
in both the short and long run’ (Electricity Pool, 1998). They also listed a number of subsidiary
objectives similar to Offer's, though they placed greater emphasis on the importance of
minimising costs and ensuring longer run sustainability.
The workings of the Pool and its shortcomings are well described in the series of Offer
papers produced in the course of the inquiry (Offer, 1998a-c). They have been discussed in two
earlier issues of the Regulatory Review: Shuttleworth (1999) and Littlechild (2001).
Shuttleworth, writing after the publication of Offer’s Interim Conclusion (Offer, 1998d), noted
that “it is difficult to find any rigorous analysis to underpin the reform proposals”, while
Newbery (1998c) concluded that “(T)he present review appears to have relied mainly upon
unsubstantiated claims, inappropriate analogies, unquantified criticisms, and a remarkably
uncritical assessment by the participants of the debate, without commissioning the kind of
detailed analysis one might have expected from a regulatory agency claiming industry
expertise.”
Briefly, the distinctive features of the English Pool are that it was a compulsory, day-
ahead, uniform last-price auction in which generators had firm rights to transmission but no firm
obligations to generate. Dispatch was centrally organised by the Grid Company acting as System
Operator (SO). Bids were submitted a day-ahead and were to be valid for every half-hour of the
3following day, though in practice generators could prescribe a large number of technical
parameters to restrict the validity of bids at various times or under various conditions. The SO
selected the least (financial) cost set of generating sets to run and issued operating instructions to
these plants. The Pool set a System Marginal Price (SMP) each half hour as the computed unit
cost of electricity from the most expensive unconstrained generation set called on to operate.
Unconstrained generators were all paid the same SMP plus a capacity payment, equal to the
Value of Lost Load (VOLL) less SMP, times the Loss of Load Probability (LoLP), which
together made the Pool Purchase Price, or PPP. Generators available but not dispatched also
received the capacity payments, while constrained generators received their bid price, if they
were required to generate within an import-constrained zone and bid above the SMP, or their
lost profit (SMP less bid price) if they were in an export constrained zone.
Although all electricity was dispatched through the Pool, more than 90% of electricity
was sold under contract, and less than 10% actually received the Pool price. The typical contract
was a Contract for Differences (CfD) for a fixed amount (M MWh, say) with an agreed strike
price, f, say. If the Pool price was p, buyers paid M(f-p) to the generator, and the generator
collected Mp from the Pool for that electricity, thus receiving in total Mf. Under or
overproduction relative to that contract would be paid the Pool price, so the Pool acted also as a
balancing market. Actions taken by the SO to achieve overall balance and quality of supply
would be charged out to all consumers and not targeted on those causing the imbalances or other
problems (though the Grid Code specified quality requirements). Although the Pool only set the
price for a small fraction of total output, that price was transparent, published a day ahead, and
clearly influenced contract prices, as any contract party retained the option to buy or sell at the
spot Pool price.
The enquiry that Offer conducted (the ‘Pool Review’) recognised that the main reason
for past market manipulation was the market power of the incumbent generators. The
restructuring at privatisation created a duopoly of fossil-generators that set the price more than
90% of the time (Newbery, 1995). Subsequent substantial entry by ‘Independent’ Power
Producers (IPPs) who built Combined Cycle Gas Turbine (CCGT) plant gradually eroded the
market share of the incumbents, but almost all their output was sold on long-term contracts,
usually to their part-owners, the Regional Electricity Companies, (RECs). The RECs retained
the franchise to supply initially about 30% of total demand, but after 1994 just the domestic  and
small industrial and commercial market (half of the total), and were allowed to pass through
their contract costs to these customers. A second complaint against the Pool was that these
generators could bid zero but receive the Pool price (plus the CfD payments). They therefore
appeared to offer no competition to the incumbents.2
Regulatory activism encouraged the incumbents to divest 6,000 MW of price-setting
coal-fired plant in 1996. The incumbents succeeded in selling the plant for a fixed amount plus
an ‘earn-out’ payment of £6/MWh of actual output, thus ensuring that prices remained high.3
                                                
2
  The criticism seems misplaced. Bidding zero guarantees dispatch and hence reduces the size of the
market for the incumbents, who lose that market for the life of the entering plant. The incumbents
therefore have a strong incentive to offer contracts at entry-deterring prices. A more telling criticism
is that IPPs bid zero to ensure contract performance for passing through the prices into the franchise
market. A yardstick purchase formula on the RECs for their franchise sales would have provided
better incentives to secure power economically and encouraged the IPPs to bid their marginal cost.
3
 Justified as the implicit price of the sulphur emission permits associated with the plant, and as a risk-
sharing device, defences that succeeded in passing regulatory scrutiny.
4Subsequent plant sales continued to lower concentration in the important price-setting mid-merit
part of the market, as shown in Figure 1 below. By the time NETA was introduced, the earn-outs
had ended, and the wholesale market was arguably one of the least concentrated in the world.
The Pool Review criticised the rules for price determination in the Pool, which it argued
allowed complex bids for small amounts of marginal plant to set prices for the whole market that
bore little relation to production costs. In contrast to other commodity markets, the demand side
had little role in setting the price, which emerged from a complex computer program designed
for the old vertically-integrated Central Electricity Generating Board (and which had no use for
half-hourly wholesale prices in any case). The fact that buyers and sellers could always trade in
the spot market reduced the incentive to contract. Contracting not only forces buyers and sellers
to bargain over the terms (and hence allows competition to work) but also, by pre-committing
the price of the covered output, reduces the incentive to manipulate the Pool price, as
manipulation only rewards the uncontracted output. Perhaps the most telling criticism was that
the governance structure of the Pool made it almost impossible to make changes to rectify any of
these perceived faults, as the Pooling and Settlement Agreement was an enforceable contract
that could only be changed by mutual consent.
The proposed trading arrangements
The Pool Review argued that the complexities of price formation in the Pool allowed generators
to exercise more market power than would have been possible had the market been structured
more like a classic commodity market. Crucially, central dispatch was abandoned and generators
were now free to arrange their own operation and had to find buyers for their output. The SO’s
task was to ensure system stability by balancing demand and supply. This was achieved by
accepting offers and bids from generators or suppliers to increase or reduce output or demand.
NETA replaced the Pooling and Settlement Agreement by a Balancing and Settlement Code
with a well-defined method of making modifications. The Pool ceased to exist. Electricity was
now to be traded in four voluntary, overlapping and interdependent markets operating over
different time scales. Bilateral contract markets cover the medium and long run, while forward
(and at some stage futures) markets offer standard contracts (base-load, peak hours) for periods
up to several years ahead. A short-term bilateral market, operating from at least 24 hours to Gate
Closure (31/2 hours before a trading period),4 allowed parties to adjust their portfolio of contracts
to match their predicted physical positions. This short-term market would yield information to
construct a spot price for each half-hour (e.g. the UKPX Reference Price Data).
At Gate Closure, the official end of the bilateral markets, all parties had to announce
their Final Physical Notifications (FPN) to the System Operator (SO). The SO would then
accept bids and offers in the last of these markets, the balancing market, to keep the system
stable. Actions in this balancing market would be fed into the Balancing Mechanism to produce
cash-out prices for clearing imbalances between traders’ FPNs and their actual (metered)
positions. This structure mirrors that emerging in the British gas market, though the Balancing
Mechanism differs sharply from spot commodity markets, to which NETA aspired.
The key differences between NETA and the Pool
The most obvious difference between NETA and the Pool is that under the Pool generation
was centrally dispatched while under NETA plant is self-dispatched. The obligation to
5balance output with demand is now placed on each generator, with the SO confined to
ensuring system stability. The Pool, that acted as both a wholesale market for all electricity
and allowed NGC as SO to balance the system, is replaced by a Balancing Mechanism (also
operated by NGC as SO) for the residual imbalances that arise because of a failure or
unwillingness of parties to self-balance. Whereas the Pool operated as a uniform single-price
auction for buying and selling all power (including that needed for system balance), the
Balancing Mechanism is run as a discriminatory (pay-as-bid) auction. NGC charges for
balancing through the Balancing Services Use of System charge.5 In addition there is an
imbalance settlement process, operated by Elexon, “for charging participants whose notified
contracted positions do not match their actual metered electricity production or consumption,
and for clearing certain other costs of balancing the system.” (BSC, 2002).
Parties may submit bids or offers to the Balancing Mechanism, specifying the price
they wish to be paid (or pay) to move away from their FPN. A generator may thus offer to
increase output (relative to his FPN), in which case if accepted he will be paid his offer price.
He may bid to reduce generation and pay to do so (to avoid the cost generating that amount).
A consumer may offer to reduce demand (and be paid in compensation) or bid (and pay) to
increase demand. The SO then selects the bids and offers needed to balance the system and
passes on details of bids and offers for Elexon to determine the cash-out prices for
imbalances. This process of determining which bids are needed to balance the system and
which remaining bids are to be used to determine the cash-out prices is both complex and to a
considerable extent arbitrary, and this summary is therefore necessarily abbreviated.
Elexon determines two cash-out prices: the weighted average of accepted offers
determines the System Buy Price (SBP) and that of bids the System Sell Price (SSP). Any
party found to be out-of-balance when metered amounts are compared with FPNs is charged
either the SBP (if they are short, that is the FPN is more than the metered output (for a
generator) or less than metered consumption (for a consumer), or they receive the SSP if they
are long (and have to spill power). The critical feature of the original design of the Balancing
Mechanism is that these prices are normally different (SBP ≥ SSP),6 and penalise each
party’s imbalances, whether or not they amplify or reduce the system imbalance as a whole.
One of the consequences of charging all imbalances (and not just those which
contribute to net imbalance) is that Elexon may make a profit (or loss, if most parties are long
and being paid to spill). Profits and losses are attributed to the “Residual Cash-flow
Reallocation” (RCRC, or the so-called “beer fund”) and paid (or charged back) to generators
and suppliers in proportion to their output or demand.
Note that there are two distinguishing characteristics of the Balancing Mechanism,
either of which could be changed independently. The first is that there are two (normally)
different prices for being short or long. The second characteristic is that these prices are
determined from a discriminatory auction in which bids and offers pay or are paid as bid, and
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 Reduced to one hour in July 2002.
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  Ofgem is wedded to the fiction that it is possible to distinguish between the cost of trades that are
required to balance the system and the penal charges levied through the cash-out prices for individual
imbalance, and has elaborate rules for drawing this distinction.
6
 The prices are equal by about 25% of the time, and SSP>SBP very occasionally (0.1% of the time).
6the average cost of securing the services is then charged out.7  One consequence of this
combination is that it is more risky for a generator to offer balancing services. If a generator
has an accepted offer to increase output, and then suffers a loss of output, he is almost certain
to have to pay more than he is paid. He may therefore prefer to retain the spinning reserve for
his own insurance. A single final balancing price would make such an offer never any worse
than self-insuring and normally better, and would thus promote a more liquid balancing
market.
The theoretical case for change
The original intention for the Balancing Mechanism was to target the costs of balancing the
system on those parties who cause the imbalance, so that they could take efficient decisions
on whether to self-balance, or leave it to the SO to secure those balancing services more
economically (and there are obvious economies of scale in providing these services at the
system level). Imbalance is a system-wide phenomenon, in that the SO only needs to manage
the net imbalance (either long or short) of the whole system.8 If a party is long when the
system is short, then that party is helping to reduce the imbalance, and should logically be
rewarded for reducing balancing costs, not penalised. The cost-responsibility intention thus
argues for a single cash-out price.
Ofgem subsequently and strongly defended the market-unfriendly dual cash-out
Balancing Mechanism as a method of forcing all parties to contract well ahead of time, to
avoid these penal charges. The long period over which deals can be struck, and the wide
variety of possible counter-parties, makes contracting more competitive. The imbalance
market is deliberately penal, with a low price for selling and a high price for buying, in order
to encourage contracting, as shown in Figure 1. The figure smoothes a very volatile series by
taking weekly moving averages of the 336 half-hourly prices. To give some idea of this
volatility, the graph of the weekly average of the daily average price plus one standard
deviation of the daily price is also shown, and the cash-out prices are compared with the
weekly average spot price from the UKPX.
The lack of a single transparent price at which trades can always be made was also
argued to reduce the incentive to collude in setting that price (by bidding in the Pool).
Although the Pool price may only have applied to less than 10% of traded power, the Pool
price was clearly salient in influencing the strike price for CfDs and hence the terms of the
remaining 90% contracted.
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 The Dutch balancing market is at the other extreme. It operates a uniform price auction to determine
a single price for those 15-minute periods in which the system is either long or short for the whole
period, and charges those who are short while rewarding those long. There is the potential (not yet
used) to add a penalty of 1Euro/MWh to both imbalances. If the system is both short and long within
the 15 minute period it determines two prices, effectively one for each sub-period in which the
imbalance is in one direction.
8
 Transmission constraints may mean that imbalances have to be addressed within each constrained
region, but the idea remains of (local) aggregate system balance.
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Figure 1 The range of system buy and sell prices
The debate over the market design for NETA was initially very confused. It was
suggested (Offer, 1998e, 3.11-3.12, Offer, 1999) that if the single-price auction of the Pool
were replaced with a pay-as-bid auction, average prices would be lower.9 Some pointed to the
revenue-equivalence theorem in auction theory, according to which under stringent
assumptions (e.g. independent/private values, single-unit demands, risk neutrality and
symmetric bidders) the average price would be the same under either design.10 In practice
those assumptions, particularly regarding symmetry and single-unit demands, are unlikely to
be satisfied, making it an empirical or experimental issue as to which design is superior under
what market conditions.
Green and McDaniel (1999) argued that a single marginal price auction was likely to be
more efficient and required less burdensome information assumptions to work well than a
pay-as-bid auction. One source of inefficiency is that the merit order may be compromised –
lower-cost plant may not be dispatched before higher cost plant, particularly if the owner of
the higher cost plant has a larger portfolio of plant and can predict more accurately the
highest accepted price. We shall discuss other sources of inefficiency below.
Laboratory evidence has produced strong support in favour of uniform price auctions
relative to discriminatory/pay-bid auctions within the framework of electricity markets.
Rassenti, Smith and Wilson (2002) find less volatile prices with a discriminatory auction; yet,
their discriminatory auction design without market power resulted in prices significantly
above prices in the uniform design with market power! Abbink, Brandts and McDaniel
(2002) report results from a laboratory experiment in which sellers are asymmetrically
informed about market demand. They argue that informational asymmetries are characteristic
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  “prices have been higher .. in part due to trading arrangements, .. a single Pool Price, which inhibits
supply side pressure.” (Offer, 1999, p3). “Any worthwhile reforms would require … the
implementation of ‘pay-as-bid’ pricing.” (ibid, p30).
10
 See Klemperer (1999) for a review of the revenue equivalence literature.
8of decentralised electricity markets, such as England and Wales under NETA, and find that
discriminatory remuneration leads to significantly less efficiency than uniform remuneration
when information is not symmetrically distributed. Both Rassenti et. al (2002) and Abbink et.
al (2002) use multi-unit demand auctions in their experiments (a relevant feature of utility
industries). Bunn and Bower (2001) provide simulation results suggesting that pay-as-bid
auctions would produce higher prices than a single marginal price auction.
The debate over market/auction design arguably paid too little attention to two important
features of the electricity market. The first is that the substantial wholesale price volatility
strongly encourages extensive contract coverage. Under the Pool over 90% was under
contracts struck in bilateral deals that were clearly pay-as-bid. The issue then resolves into
handling the residual spot market. Under NETA this is through screen trading the day before
that produces a narrow spread, and then in the Balancing Mechanism. One argument against a
marginal price auction for a very thin market with a very unpredictable steepness of the
supply schedule is that the price may be very volatile. Paying-as-bid and averaging the cost
then may reduce the volatility.  The other solution is to increase the volume and liquidity of
the residual market, and the Pool did that by requiring all generation to be bid in. An
unresolved question is whether a single-price auction for balancing services would increase
liquidity enough to reduce volatility, and lower the average cost of securing these services.
Under NETA, the amount of electricity handled by the Balancing Mechanism is only
about 3% of the total, and the form of the auction is probably less important than the penal
dual-price cash-out. If that were replaced by a single price targeted on net contributions to
system imbalance (as in The Netherlands), then the total volume of imbalance trading (not
the net imbalance) may increase, and the design issue could reassert itself as significant.
Traded volume and liquidity would also increase with a single marginal price, as generators
would be exposed to less risk bidding in to the balancing market. If they were then to go
short, they would receive the same price for their offers as they had to pay in imbalance,
while at present they risk making a loss unless they bid high.
The dual cash-out prices and the instability and unpredictability of the SBP have
probably attracted the most concentrated criticism of all aspects of NETA. Two proposed
modifications (P74 and P78) were considered by the BSC Panel in July 2002. Modification
P74 proposed a single price, reflecting the net position of the whole system (a SBP when
short, and a SSP when long), with the SSP < the spot price < SBP. The other, P78, nominally
retains two cash-out prices, though the effect is rather like a single cash-out price. The SBP
would be set at the market price when the system is long, and retain the SSP for those spilling
power, while setting the SSP equal to the market price when the system is short, but charge
those short the SBP. The BSC Panel advised Ofgem that the “alternative” versions of both
modifications were preferable, but Ofgem rejected this advice on 9 September 2002 (and in
particular the single cash-out price of P74) and instead accepted the original P78, to come
into effect on 25 February 2003). While this reform may reduce the incentive to go long, it
does not remove the discriminatory nature of the auction (including the different price paid to
an offering generator and charged if he then goes short).11
One of the key questions is whether NETA would deliver lower prices than the Pool in
the presence of market power, as its proponents argued (Currie, 2000). Rassenti et. al (2002)
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  This particular discouragement to a more liquid balancing market could be overcome by
guaranteeing that any offer that is matched by a call is cancelled financially.
9provide some empirical evidence casting some doubt on this argument. We find results on the
theoretical side as well, but they are far from decisive. Allaz and Vila (1993) consider a
Cournot oligopoly model in which producers take the output decisions of their rivals as
given. If they can contract ahead, then they can pre-commit some part of their output
decision, and thereby influence the output decisions of their rivals, inducing them to reduce
their output and helping raise price while ceding market share to the original producer. If all
producers simultaneously sign contracts, on the assumption that they cannot influence other
contracts, then collectively they commit to produce more output and final prices will be
lower. Under strong assumptions on the game form, the only perfect equilibrium in a static
Cournot game (in which producers can repeatedly offer additional contracts for the same
future period) is the competitive equilibrium.
The problem with this argument is that these conditions are not satisfied in the electricity
market. Producers meet daily in a continuing sequence of encounters, and the theory of
repeated games is delicate and inconclusive. In addition, the Cournot assumption may be
inappropriate (Green and Newbery, 1992), and there is ample evidence that the outcome can
be above the competitive price (as was clearly the case for many years in the Pool).
Contracting does reduce the incentive to exercise market power in the spot market (Newbery,
1998a), but market power can still influence the terms on which contracts are struck.
If generators have market power, and if they need not fear entry, then conditions in the
electricity market would seem to favour generators. Consumers have a highly inelastic
demand and are clearly willing to pay high prices rather than be cut off. The Value of Lost
Load in the Pool was set at £2,000/MWh (1990 prices), based on some rather anecdotal
evidence and a view of the desirable level of capacity payments. This figure was also used in
the Victorian electricity market, but after several embarrassing power cuts, there were
suggestions to raise the figure, perhaps by a factor of 10.12 Generators, on the other hand,
only forgo price less variable cost for the period they are not supplying, which, in competitive
markets, may be very modest. Any generator that knows that without some output, remaining
supply cannot meet demand at a reasonable price, can demand a high price for contracting (or
supplying spot) in that period. It is difficult to see how increasing pressure on consumers to
contract ahead of time (as under NETA) does much to reduce the market power the contract
providers possess.
The critical proviso in this argument is that generators ignore the threat of entry. Newbery
(1998a) argued that in a contestable market, oligopoly generators would offer contracts at an
entry-deterring price (assuming they had enough capacity), to avoid the costly risk of
permanently losing a fraction of their market. Under the Pool, and certainly before the
domestic franchise was ended in 1999, the market was contestable. IPPs could sign 15-year
contracts with RECs for power off-take, then sign 15-year gas contracts, borrow on the back
of these contracts and finance CCGTs with performance guarantees, all with negligible risk.
The Pool offered a guaranteed market and a clear marker price for contracts, and was
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  In the Pool, the Loss of Load Probability (LoLP) was arguably over-estimated (Newbery, 1998b), so
that the product of VOLL and LoLP may have produced acceptable results. In Australia, VOLL was
only paid after load was lost, so generators had to make their own predictions of the LoLP that may
have been more accurate.
10
apparently protected by an impressively strong Pooling and Settlement Agreement.13 The
result was that the market was contestable in the classic sense that the post-entry price could
be locked in before entry in the contract, and the incumbents would lose that part of the
market for 15+ years.
The real test of NETA is whether the market would be as contestable as under a marginal
priced Pool, in the presence of market power. Newbery (1998c) argued that the increased
risks of trading under NETA with penal imbalance charges would encourage vertical
integration between generation and supply or retailing (as has happened on a wide scale). A
vertically integrated industry with risky imbalance penalties would if anything be harder for
IPPs to enter. Finally, and not directly connected with NETA, the ending of the domestic
franchise has removed the natural counter-parties to the kind of long-term contract that makes
entry contestable. One can imagine various combinations of policy that could hamper or
facilitate contestability. A supply franchise with vertical integration would likely be worse,
while a supply franchise and a prohibition on more than a certain fraction of that market
served by own or affiliated generation (as in Britain pre-1999) might preserve contestability
even with NETA.
Apart from the conditions of entry, it is far from clear that bilateral physical contracting
combined with a discriminatory Balancing Mechanism mitigates market power more than
bilateral financial contracting combined with a single price auction market of last resort. The
practical question is whether, as Ofgem fears, a shift to a single price in the Balancing
Mechanism would significantly discourage contracting ahead of time, and if so whether that
would give rise to higher average prices for electricity. In order to address that question we
need first to examine wholesale prices under NETA and compare them with costs and pre-
NETA (Pool) evidence. Ofgem (2002) provides much of the relevant evidence in graphical
form, so that presented here is much abbreviated.
The evolution of wholesale prices pre and post-NETA
NETA went live on 27 March 2001 after a delay of six months. The introduction of NETA
was not the only dramatic change in the British generation industry. Between November 1999
and February 2000 the concentration of coal fired generation capacity (measured by the
Herfindal Herschmann Index, or HHI, fell from 2644 to 1688. The standard US anti-trust
measure of a concentrated industry is one with a HHI higher than 1800, and below 1300 the
industry is considered unconcentrated. The concentration of coal plant continued to fall, and
fell below 1300 in January 2002. The concentration of fossil plant (i.e. excluding nuclear) fell
below 1800 in July 1999 and below 1300 in April 2000 – before NETA.
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  In the even, the PSA was destroyed by legislation, and the Pool price in contracts ceased to exist,
forcing contract renegotiation. Future IPPs may be more cautious when contemplating entry into an
apparently liberalised market.
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Figure 2 The effect of generation ownership on competition and wholesale prices
Figure 2 shows the evolution of coal capacity concentration and the real (2001 prices)
wholesale price of electricity, taken as the Pool Purchase Price before March 2001 (and thus
including capacity payments that now must be recovered in simple bids), and the average
daily UKPX price thereafter. The graph of prices is a 12-month centred moving average to
remove seasonality, extended with recent quarterly figures. They show a striking fall in the
price shortly after the critical change in industrial concentration.14 The crucial point to note is
that the decline in prices preceded NETA ‘go-live’ and followed shortly after the rapid
divestiture of plant in the latter part of 1999. John Bower (2002) (who supplied the plant data
used in Figure 2) has already demonstrated this more rigorously using formal econometric
tests. Further evidence of the effect of competition (and spare capacity, which was also
increasing in this period) can be seen by comparing the average wholesale price for each half-
hour settlement period in the winter months (Dec-Feb), when demand is at its seasonal peak.
Figure 3 shows that prices were more volatile across the day in the winters of 1998/9 and
1999/2000 (rewarding flexible and mid-merit plant owned by the incumbents at the expense
of base-load new CCGT entry). In the winter 2000/01, the last winter before NETA go-live,
the time profile collapsed to the same real level as in the first winter after NETA (all prices
are reflated to 2001 average values).Ofgem claimed that the fall in prices was in anticipation
of NETA, but the prices shown are not contract prices, but spot prices for which arguably the
winter of 2000/01 was the last chance to enjoy the opportunities to manipulate the Pool
before it was replaced by NETA. It seems far more likely that the fall in prices was primarily
driven by the fall in concentration. This may have been aided by the ending of the long-term
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  The impact of the earlier fall in concentration on prices (in 1996 after Offer encouraged divestiture
of 6,000 MW of coal-fired plant) was largely offset by an “earn-out” payment of £6/MWh to the
incumbents that supported the prices bid by divested plant.
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PPA contracts between the IPPs and the RECs, which the ending of the franchise, and the
ending of the reference Pool strike price, forced to lapse.
Winter real wholesale prices pre- and post-NETA by settlement period
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Figure 3 Average daily profile of prices in the Pool and UKPX, 2001 prices
Assessment of NETA
NETA has addressed one obvious shortcoming of the Pool – the difficulty of making socially
desirable improvements that may adversely impact the profits of one of the parties. It may be
that as a result some of the more obvious present problems can be addressed. One of these is
the operation of the Balancing Mechanism, where the imbalance prices penalise each party
individually. This encourages over-contracting (as shown in the Appendix). On average
suppliers should be over-contracted by 80% of the Standard Deviation (SD) of their forecast
demand, so that if their individual forecast uncertainty is 5%, they should be on average 4%
over-contracted. The average cost of being over-contracted by the optimal amount (which
varies by half-hour) from December 2001 to August 2002 was £3.32/MWh of SD, and the
average base-load spot price over the same period was £15.13. Thus for a 5% forecast error
the extra cost of over-contracting was 5% of £3.32 = £0.17 or 1.1% of the purchase cost.
Compared to the fall in prices that is small, though not compared to the fall in costs.
Generators are likely to be able to forecast output more accurately, except for
unexpected outages, and respond to the penal imbalances somewhat differently. One form of
insurance against penal imbalance prices is holding plant part-loaded in case of generator
outages. This is costly, as the thermal efficiency of a part-loaded 500 MW coal-fired plant
falls from 35% to 32% (net calorific basis, Henney, 2002). This raises fuel costs by nearly
10% or perhaps £1/MWh. The estimate annual extra cost of running an additional 3,600 MW
of part-loaded plant is 1.3 million tonnes of extra coal, or £40 million per year. The extra CO2
emissions are estimated at 0.5-1 million tonnes carbon (MtC), a figure that can be compared
with the target for the Renewables Obligations for 2010 of 2.5 MtC.
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The Law of Large Numbers means that NGC is able to provide more accurate system-
wide forecasts and hence would be able to balance the whole system more cheaply than
individuals. Ofgem’s NETA Review (Ofgem, 2002, p3) states that “NGC’s gross balancing
actions (buying and selling electricity) have been around 2% of demand,” confirming that the
incentives to balance are high and effective. One consequence is that NGC can secure
reserves more cheaply as more plant is already running, so reserve costs are not properly
allocated.
The costs of switching to NETA have been estimated at about £700 million (spread
over a five year period) followed by annual costs of £30 million.15 Some of the switching
costs might have been needed to update old software even if the Pool had continued, but the
extra costs of operating a trading desk 24 hours per day, 7 days per week, to deal with half-
hourly balancing, are certainly substantial, and probably exceed £30 million/year. Whether
these large costs are exceeded by social (rather than transfer) benefits must be doubtful, and
is being investigated by the National Audit Office. Our pessimistic conclusion is that most
and perhaps all of the price fall is attributable to increased competition, not NETA, and so the
costs and disruption were unnecessary. In the longer run, entry may be more difficult and
security of supply will not have been enhanced by removing capacity payments.
Development of auctions for managing natural monopolies
The current use of auctions for allocating access to the National Transmission System (NTS)
in Britain replaced previous methods of negotiation and “grandfathering” with regulated
access tariffs set at the long-run marginal cost of increasing capacity at that node - both of
which were shown to be flawed as market conditions changed. Neither approach was
adequate for allocating capacity rights in the face of real scarcity. McDaniel and Neuhoff
(2002a) use the history of the British gas industry to support the claim that auctions are an
appropriate means of allocating scarce network capacity given that there is competition in
production as well as supply. Without competition in production expected prices will equal
the reserve price (normally related to the previous regulated price), in which case auctions are
unnecessary and costly. Without competition in supply, bidders can pass on uncompetitive
auction prices to downstream consumers. In what follows we describe some of the important
features of the industry and how they relate to the current short-term auctions.
The market players in the gas industry are producers, suppliers, and traders; these are
not mutually exclusive so, for example, a producer may also supply gas to final consumers.
Most producers using the NTS have gas fields in the North Sea and land their gas on the
beach at one of the main entry terminals to the gas network. The production side of the gas
industry has been competitive for some time, but it is only since 1995 that British Gas’
control of the supply side of the market has fallen below 50 percent. In 2000 the supply arm
of the former British Gas, Centrica, had a market share below 40 percent. The movement in
the industry towards auctions appears to be in line with changes in the industry structure and
concentration. The former methods of allocating rights by negotiation and grandfathering
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 “The costs of implementing and operating the new trading arrangements are estimated to be
between about £136m to £146m per annum, for a five year period.  Thereafter the operating costs are
expected to be of the order of £30m per annum.” (Offer, 1999, p14).
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were discriminatory by design, discouraged entry and were therefore incompatible with full
liberalisation.16
There are six major gas terminals on the British coast: St. Fergus, Teeside,
Theddlethorpe, Easington, Bacton and Barrow, plus a number of (small) on-shore sites and
LNG storage facilities. The most utilised of the major terminals is St. Fergus in Scotland
(where there are considerable transmission constraints) and Bacton in the south-east (where
gas heading for the Zeebrugge interconnector enters). Gas from producers is landed at these
beach terminals where it can be sold to traders or entered into the network by the producer.
The value of entry rights is the expected difference between the spot price on the beach and
the price where gas is traded downstream at the National Balancing Point (NBP). Presently
entry capacity is auctioned concurrently by entry terminal and by month twice each year.17
Auctions in March allocate rights at each terminal for the period April to September; auctions
in September allocate rights from October to March. Entry rights are use-it-or-lose-it and
unsold/undeclared rights are auctioned in subsequent daily and within-day auctions. Each
auction has four rounds (plus a fifth ‘residual’ round with a slightly different dynamic), and
in all cases the auctions are sealed-bid and pricing is pay-as-bid.18
The design favoured by the network owner and auctioneer, Transco, during the
consultation process was a modified second price (i.e., Vickrey) open outcry auction that
accommodates multi-unit demands. This particular auction is due to Ausubel and is explained
in Ausubel (1997). The design ultimately implemented was a sealed-bid, multi-round option.
It can be seen as a compromise given that it is more familiar and less complex than the
Ausubel auction. This was partly to do with time restrictions and having the requisite systems
in place before the September 1999 launch, and partly due to the generic unfamiliarity with
the auction of choice. The auction design can also be seen as a compromise given the trade-
off between discouraging collusion on the one hand (as would be more easily achieved in an
open outcry design) and minimising the winner’s curse on the other. As shippers’ values are
positively correlated, multiple rounds allow for learning, thereby minimising the chance of
‘paying too much’. Although the general design of the auction was retained through
subsequent semi-annual rounds, the details, especially the measurement of capacity available,
have changed in every auction (particularly that for Winter 2001).19
                                                
16
 Gas storage has also been allocated using auctions since March 1999. We do not discuss the storage
auctions in this chapter but details of background and an analysis of the March-April 1999 auctions
can be found in Hawdon and Stevens (2001).
17
 Concurrently implies that all terminals and all months are auctioned at the same time.
18
 The rules of the auction can be found in the Network Code which can be downloaded from
Transco’s WebPages: http\\www.transco.co.uk.
19
  This is not the place for an extended discussion of the problem of defining capacity. Ofgem has
argued throughout for a “more robust, independently verifiable measure of capacity …. linked to the
maximum physical capacity available at each terminal” (Ofgem, 2001b). Maximum physical capacity
is defined as the maximum volume of gas that can be injected at a terminal on the day with the highest
demand that can be expected in 20 years, setting the injections at all other terminals to maximise
capacity at the terminal in question. It is a theoretical measure of the maximum that could be made
available. Until September 2002, the capacity made available was related to the Seasonal Normal
Demand, presumably because the system is capable of actually delivering this. The obvious objection
to that measure is that the system can frequently take considerably more, so the capacity is being
artificially restricted. That may not matter if everyone knows that the remaining capacity actually
available will be marketed on the day (ideally in a liquid spot capacity market).
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There are a number of ways to measure the performance of the short-term auctions.
One might be interested in the amount of revenue generated, the relative cost of alleviating
network constraints (as measured by the cost to the network owner of buying back rights
when demand for access exceeds supply), or the efficiency of the allocation. Jannsen and
Moldovanu (2002) provide examples where various plausible auction objectives do not
coincide. For example, if there is a market after the auction in which the bidders are
competitors, then the bidders’ valuations may be contingent on the identity of the other
winners. In this case, bidder A’s value may be lower if B is a winner than if C is a winner,
and A may bid higher if bidding against B in order to prevent B from winning. The outcome
may be socially inefficient even though bidders have maximised their individual valuations.
This possibility is particularly relevant for utility auctions since bidders later compete in the
downstream supply market.
When objectives cannot be simultaneously met then a choice between them should be
made before the auction is designed. It is fairly easy to contend in the case of gas that
efficiency should take precedence over revenue maximisation when the two do not coincide.
This is arguably the case for any auction where the auctioneer is a regulated monopolist. Also
secondary markets may not always resolve primary market misallocations. Jehiel and
Moldovanu (1999) illustrate the shortcomings of secondary markets when one must rely on
bilateral trading while, in  a model of auctions for long-term capacity rights, McDaniel and
Neuhoff (2002b) show that if there are costs for entrants then traders will reduce but not
eliminate differences between socially optimal outcomes and auction outcomes.
 McDaniel and Neuhoff (2002a) measure the performance of the short-term auctions
according to two metrics: the closeness between monthly and daily auction prices at St.
Fergus, and costs of constraint alleviation. First, if the monthly auctions are performing well
then the prices observed should resemble daily auction prices. As a proxy for the daily
auction price at St. Fergus, McDaniel and Neuhoff use a 30-day moving average of the
difference between spot prices on the beach at St. Fergus and prices at the NBP. This proxy
for daily prices is compared to the realised monthly auction prices between September 1999
and March 2002. They conclude that the auction price is a good predictor of the spot prices
and take this as evidence that the auctions are working well according to this metric.
Deviations between these prices can be traced to features external to (and thus not anticipated
by) the auction, such as a post-auction increase in oil prices which increases the demand for
interconnector access to the Continent and consequently the demand for domestic gas. When
events after the auction cause the price at the NBP to rise there will be a gap between spot
prices at St. Fergus and NBP prices when the network is constrained since gas landed at St.
Fergus cannot enter the network.
Second, again using data on average spot prices at St. Fergus and the NBP, McDaniel
and Neuhoff (2002a) show that the value of access rights increased by a factor of ten during
the period September 1999 to October 2000 (from 0.7p/therm to 6.7p/therm) but that the cost
of alleviating constraints fell over the same period. The increased transparency of the auction
over previous allocation methods means that Transco has an objective measure for what the
rights are worth to shippers; however, since capacity buy backs may not occur until the gas-
day the price of buy-backs can still be above the prices paid in the auction.
McDaniel and Neuhoff confined their analysis to St. Fergus on the grounds that, at
least for later auctions, the mark-up of the auction price above the reserve price is low at
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other terminals,20 indicating either that there are few bidders and/or that there are no
constraints.21 Because there are only seven auctions to date and the rules have changed
substantially between the early ones, it is difficult to make reliable statements about outcomes
between auctions. However, trends within auctions can be observed and differences between
terminals within auctions. It is possible, for example, to look for relationships between
scarcity, the number of bidders and competition. Even if there are only a few bidders (who
are unable to collude) the existence of network constraints should lead to competition among
bidders. Conversely, in the absence of constraints, having many bidders may not ensure
prices above the reserve. This latter point is important because, if the price always equals the
reserve price, why have an auction? Auctions can be costly and time consuming for both the
bidders and the auctioneer, and if there is lack of competition or lack of scarcity, then setting
regulated tariffs might be a preferable alternative.
For some of the early auctions prices are grossly exaggerated relative to the reserve
price at terminals where constraints are normally not a problem. This could either indicate a
need for learning or be a result of privately held information and expectations about
macroeconomic conditions. Figure 4 shows the mark-ups of the average auction price over
the reserve price in each month at St. Fergus and Bacton for the last six auctions.22 The two
graphs show mark-ups for auctions 2-4 (left panel) and auctions 5-7 (right panel) separately
to contrast the convergence of the reserve price at Bacton in later auctions to the sustained
high mark-ups at St. Fergus. Expectations about macroeconomic conditions such as changing
oil prices should especially affect bidders at Bacton since the price of gas on the Continent is
linked to the price of oil, and rising Continental gas prices increases the demand for Bacton-
Zeebrugge interconnector capacity. Such a situation may help to explain the extremely high
mark-ups at Bacton in the March 2001 auctions. That is, if shippers were expecting the high
oil prices of Summer 2000 to continue then they would anticipate continuing higher
Continental gas prices and consequent scarce NTS entry capacity at Bacton. One
disadvantage of auctioning capacity rights for six month intervals is therefore that uncertainty
over future economic conditions means there will often be deviations between the monthly
and daily access prices, in which case the monthly price will be a poor indicator of daily
prices.
Figure 4 also shows the average number of bidders for each of the auctions.23 The
legend for the graphs show the terminal (F = Fergus and B = Bacton), the month (M = March,
S = September) and the year (2000 or 2001). There are more shippers bidding for rights at St.
Fergus than elsewhere on the network; the lines for St. Fergus are mostly to the right of
Bacton in the left graph and strictly to the right of Bacton in the right graph.
                                                
20
  The reserve price is computed from the previous regulated price (based on long-run marginal cost
of injections at the terminal) and adjusted for the degree of competition, with a lower reserve as
competition increases (measured by the HHI).
21
  The extreme case is Barrow where there are at most two bidders, one of which is Centrica.
22
  The lines link the set of months in each auction, graphing mark-ups as a function of number of
bidders, not the order in time of the months.
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Figure 4: Mark-ups vs. number of bidders, St. Fergus and Bacton. Points give averages
over rounds for each of the six months (linked together by lines).
For the early auctions there is much more variability in both the number of bidders
and the mark-up at Bacton. The range of bidders is unusually large at Bacton in March 2001,
ranging between 4 and 18 in some months over the four auction rounds. In all auctions except
September 2001 there is little variation within auctions at St. Fergus in either the number of
bidders or mark-ups. Another difference between the two terminals is that, unlike at Bacton,
there is an obvious (though subtle) positive trend between the number of bidders and the
percentage mark-up within auctions at St. Fergus. This is reassuring since it suggests that an
increase in the number of bidders can increase competition when there are constraints (as is
the usual case at St. Fergus). At Bacton the trend between bidders and mark-ups is less
obvious and much more erratic within auctions. What is interesting is that although the
number of bidders does not change substantially between early and later auctions, there is a
convergence to the reserve price. Again this is reassuring as it supports the claim that when
there is no scarcity the benefits of auctions relative to regulated tariffs is unclear.
Bacton stands in the middle of two extremes for when Continental gas prices are
higher than in Britain there will be high demand for entry at Bacton. Thus, rationing may
indeed be required at those times. When Continental gas prices are equal to or lower than
British prices demand will fall, possibly to zero. The opposite extreme is no competition at no
scarcity, which is illustrated by Barrow in the south-west that is dominated by a single bidder
and where the auction always clears at the reserve price.
Longer term auction to guide investment
McDaniel and Neuhoff (2002a) argue that the monthly auctions appear to be successful with
respect to: anticipating daily auction prices, reducing the cost of alleviating constraints, and
capturing producer rents (as indicated by the high revenues obtained in the auctions). Ofgem
now wants to take the auctions a step further by allowing future investment in the network to
be guided by auctions of long-term entry rights and funded by the auction revenues obtained.
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 This is the average of total bidders, not total successful bidders.
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This is a radical step and it does not follow that this is an obvious extension of the current
monthly auction. The idea that auctions might provide for the correct amount of network
investment overlooks a number of important market failures and fails to fully consider the
strategic objectives of bidders who already use the auction and the potential impact on future
entry. This use of auctions is still quite controversial and there is still ambiguity about the
auction design (as well as the proper measure of capacity).24
One feature of the long-term auctions is that some portion of capacity rights will be
reserved for short-term markets (e.g., yearly, monthly, daily, with-in day).25 This portion
might either be a fixed fraction of existing capacity or it might vary depending on the
outcome in the long-term auction. Reserving some rights for short-term markets can improve
competition by making it easier for traders and entrants to obtain rights. McDaniel and
Neuhoff (2002b) build a simple model that captures the salient features of the potential
designs cited in Ofgem (2001a). Their paper considers the division of rights between short
and long-term auctions and suggests that market power or shippers’ private information about
production plans can distort the auction away from the socially optimal outcome. The
magnitude of this distortion depends on the proportion of rights allocated to short-term
markets. The auctioneer must therefore choose between different objectives: (i) removing
distortions arising from market power, (ii) extracting private information about production
plans, or (iii) removing distortions created by network effects; i.e., the fact that shippers land
their gas at different points on the network.
While the use of auctions for allocating short-term scarce capacity on the British
network has proven to be an improvement relative to the previous methods of selective
negotiation and grandfathering with regulated tariffs this is not sufficient justification for
using them as a guide for future investment. Long-term auction outcomes can be highly
sensitive to the auction parameters and there will be conflicts between the myriad of
objectives the auction is meant to achieve. It is not clear that such auctions will provide for a
more efficient network and allocation of access rights relative to regulatory approved
capacity expansion.
Auctions for electricity capacity
Another rapidly developing opportunity for using auctions in the electricity market is for
access to inter-connectors. Inter-connector auctions into The Netherlands came into effect on
1 January 2000. The England-France inter-connector capacity has been competitively
allocated since 1 April 2001. It is interesting to compare and contrast these two different
inter-connector auctions and discuss their role in the integration of European electricity
markets.
One of the key issues in inter-connector auction design is whether the capacity to be
sold is to be defined on the net or gross flows. At present, inter-connectors to The
Netherlands and to England are only sold for gross flows – that is, the entire capacity
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 Ofgem have just recommended that annual auctions should begin in January 2003, Ofgem (2002).
25
 We use “long-term” to refer to auctions for capacity rights more than three years in the future while
“short-term” usually refers to capacity rights up to six months in the future (as with the current gas
entry capacity auctions). Where long-term auctions exists, short-term might then refer to any period in
which the capacity which is being bid for already exists or is already being built; e.g., auctions for
rights less than three years in advance.
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available in either direction is sold separately.26 An alternative would be to algebraically sum
bids for import and export capacity (where exports would be defined as negative imports) and
allocate the total capacity to the net flow. This principle of superposition would mean that if
traders wished to export 500MW from The Netherlands to Germany, when the import
capacity into The Netherlands were 1000MW, then the auction would allocate capacity of
1500MW for available imports. The auction price for imports would be paid by importers and
paid to exporters. For this to work, exporters would have an obligation to export (in practice
to net off against imports) in order that their production decision (in The Netherlands) and
consumption decision (in Germany) could be balanced against demand in The Netherlands
and supply in Germany. That way, the actual flow of electricity on the inter-connector would
indeed be the algebraic difference between imports and exports. Failure to export would have
to be subject to imbalance charges as import commitments could no longer be honoured and
would need to be compensated.
The most active auction into The Netherlands is from Germany, where two grid
connections are separately auctioned. Capacity is auctioned for yearly capacity (i.e. for base-
load), monthly capacity and, on the day ahead, for each hour of the following day. Capacity
obtained is subject to a “use it or lose it” principle so that any capacity that is not nominated
to the system operators before a certain time is released and sold on the daily auction. The
auctions are uniform price and the lowest accepted price determines the price for all capacity
in that auction. The two German-Dutch auctions (from RWE and Eon to TenneT) clear
simultaneously but independently, so prices normally differ, though on average are similar.
Any import capacity secured must be bid through the Dutch spot market (APX).
Traders can bid for hourly capacity in the day-ahead inter-connector auction, then buy
electricity in the German spot market (LPX or EEX), and sell electricity into the APX.
Normally, prices in Germany are below those in The Netherlands, and as a result the inter-
connectors are fully used and the auction price clears at a positive level.  Figure 5 shows the
average of the cost of bidding for base-load capacity on the two German-Dutch
interconnectors in the month-ahead and day-ahead auctions. This can be compared with the
average price difference between the two markets for those hours where the price difference
was positive (and hence worth using the interconnector).
The yearly and monthly auctions appear efficient, in that the 2001 yearly auction
cleared at close to the price difference of year-ahead base-load OTC contracts in the two
different markets, as did the monthly market. The daily market is not so well arbitraged, and
the daily inter-connect auction clears on average at a lower price than the spot market price
difference. This may reflect the risk that the hourly spot prices are not known at the time of
bidding for inter-connector capacity, in contrast to the yearly and monthly auctions where
there are suitable financial contracts to guide price discovery.
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 System security issues may mean that the capacity in each direction that is reliably available may
differ.
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Figure 5  Comparison of costs and returns to buying interconnection
The England-France inter-connector has a rather different design. As in The
Netherlands, capacity in each direction is sold separately, so there is no superposition of
flows. Since the Powernext market in France provided a spot market price, the prices have
been higher in France in 42% of the hours (Dec-01 to Aug-02).27 At some periods traders
may wish to both export and import and in such hours the flows are in fact netted, but the
inter-connector is then under-utilised.
The capacity is sold under three-year contracts through sealed bid tenders, one-year
and quarterly contracts through pay-as-bid auctions, and daily capacity also in pay-as-bid
auctions. Again, the capacity is subject to the use-it-or-lose-it principle, and is then resold on
the daily auction. The lack of liquidity in the spot market Powernext in France appears to
restrict the number of potential bidders (normally to 2-3), and may justify a pay-as-bid
auction. The spread of prices is normally quite small, with the marginal bid varying between
101-125% of the weighted average bid. Figure 6 graphs the most recent annual and quarterly
weighted average bids of capacity from France to England (expressed per MWh, (dividing
the effective daily cost of base-load by 24), and the excess of the UK spot price over the
hourly Powernext price (again for hours when this is positive). The average (positive) price
difference (Dec-01 to Aug-02) is 5.07 Euro/MWh, while the cost of annual auction for
calendar year 2002 was 4.14 Euro/MWh. The average of the quarterly auctions was 2.46
Euro/MWh, suggesting either risk aversion, high transaction costs or illiquidity as reasons for
the imperfect arbitrage.
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  Interestingly, French prices are higher than English prices more than half the time in hours 7-10
and 15-17 (French time).
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Figure 6 Cost and profit of trading from France to England
The most obvious reform to improve the efficiency of the interconnector auctions
would be integrate spot and auction markets so that they clear simultaneously on net flows.
This would in effect require or create a single EU-wide power exchange, and would be
resisted by individual power exchanges. It would have the additional and possibly decisive
advantage of reducing market power in local markets. At present, interconnect capacity is
bought ahead of spot electricity, and creates either inelastic demand or supply, which
enhances market power. If demand for interconnection were jointly determined with local
supply and demand, the effective demand and supply schedules would be more elastic.
Conclusions
Auctions are increasingly used to determine prices in gas and electricity markets. In
electricity, they are used for pricing scarce inter-connector capacity, and for determining the
spot price, while in gas they are used to price entry into the high pressure gas system, and for
allocating storage. In all these cases, auctions determine the price and allocation of currently
available resources, whether it is existing transport capacity or the output of existing
production facilities. Auctions have been used for commodity spot markets probably for as
long as producers and traders have met to exchange, but the idea of using auctions to price
natural monopoly facilities is relatively new and attractive to those who consider regulation a
costly and imperfect way of setting prices and allocating resources.
The temptation is to believe that the price discovery role of auctions can be used to
guide investment decisions in long-lived natural monopoly elements. Clearly the price signals
emerging from spot auctions are informative, but there are risks involved in relying solely on
auctions to determine future capacity, at least without clearly specifying how and when the
regulator may step in to ensure adequate capacity if the auctions deliver apparently
inadequate investment. There are then dangers that investors will fear future excess capacity
(which has social and external benefits in increasing reliability and reducing market power)
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and will thus underbid for new investment, validating the need for additional investment and
low prices.
As for electricity trading arrangements, Britain has abandoned the Pool model that has
been so influential in other electricity reforms, and has adopted a market structure that has
more similarity to Continental electricity markets, though these still prefer non-
discriminatory or last-price auctions, even for balancing. Wholesale prices have fallen
dramatically. It has not yet clear whether this is because of a massive increase in the
competitiveness of the wholesale market just predating NETA, or the end of the domestic
franchise, or the removal of the contractual basis for long-term power purchase agreements
by ending the Pool, or as a result of NETA itself. Sceptics argue that the price fall is not due
to NETA and would have happened anyway in a competitive Pool, at much lower cost, with a
more sustainably contestable market providing better supply security. No doubt future issues
of the Review will be better placed to allocate praise and blame for the final convergence of
British prices to Continental levels.
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Appendix: The optimal degree of over-contracting by a supplier
Suppose that forecast demand is a random variable Q = QZKHUHLVGLVWULEXWHGDVF
The amount contracted will be K = (1+x1QZKHUH1LVWKHFRHIILFLHQWRIYDULDWLRQDQG6’RI
7KHVHOOLQJSULFHRIQ is P, the contract price for purchasing wholesale is p, and the system
buy price (SBP) for imbalances is b, the SSP is s7KHH[SHFWHGSURILWLVWKHQZKHUH
or
The optimal degree of over-contracting is then xZKLFKPD[LPLVHV
so the value of x solves
Given values for b/p and s/pDQGWKHSUREDELOLW\GLVWULEXWLRQRIZKLFKWRDILUVWDSSUR[LPDWLRQ
can be taken as normal), the optimal degree of over-contracting x can be solved. Thus taking the
data from 3 Dec 2001 to 15 June 2002, the average for the same half-hour each day of F([1) is
0.79 with a range from 0.54 to 0.94 and a SD of 0.09. If F is normal, then the supplier should on
DYHUDJHEH1 RYHUFRQWUDFWHG UDQJLQJ IURP1 LQ++  WR 1 LQ++
(1600-1630).
A slightly more sophisticated calculation takes the average value for each half-hour
period of x=Min(0, F-1(Max[0.99, Min{(b/p-1)/(b/p-s/p)}] )).28 This produces almost exactly the
same answer of x ranging from 0.3 to 1.3 with an average value of 0.83.
                                                
28
 The constraints are to rule out infeasible or implausible numbers (i.e. under-contracting).
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